The Japan Times - Iran's collapse fuels Revolt

EUR -
AED 4.33804
AFN 76.779267
ALL 96.374356
AMD 447.71893
ANG 2.114485
AOA 1083.182631
ARS 1712.435599
AUD 1.697929
AWG 2.129156
AZN 2.011163
BAM 1.949197
BBD 2.381632
BDT 144.620112
BGN 1.983712
BHD 0.445341
BIF 3515.012221
BMD 1.181224
BND 1.502025
BOB 8.200568
BRL 6.212068
BSD 1.182494
BTN 108.134162
BWP 15.563937
BYN 3.38593
BYR 23151.984599
BZD 2.378154
CAD 1.613144
CDF 2675.471776
CHF 0.921278
CLF 0.025959
CLP 1025.018142
CNY 8.211572
CNH 8.199329
COP 4283.495142
CRC 586.717511
CUC 1.181224
CUP 31.302428
CVE 109.892748
CZK 24.309266
DJF 210.575606
DKK 7.470035
DOP 74.68921
DZD 153.350921
EGP 55.624997
ERN 17.718356
ETB 184.332392
FJD 2.632594
FKP 0.862003
GBP 0.865223
GEL 3.183433
GGP 0.862003
GHS 12.966078
GIP 0.862003
GMD 86.229201
GNF 10375.983988
GTQ 9.073265
GYD 247.402417
HKD 9.225398
HNL 31.214264
HRK 7.534907
HTG 154.976996
HUF 381.085803
IDR 19826.839872
ILS 3.660205
IMP 0.862003
INR 108.080773
IQD 1549.052714
IRR 49759.048718
ISK 144.994919
JEP 0.862003
JMD 185.663438
JOD 0.837461
JPY 183.725144
KES 152.531745
KGS 103.297792
KHR 4761.073794
KMF 490.207333
KPW 1063.101334
KRW 1718.00772
KWD 0.362955
KYD 0.985404
KZT 597.142286
LAK 25429.965772
LBP 105893.477113
LKR 366.184232
LRD 219.356234
LSL 18.93177
LTL 3.487847
LVL 0.714511
LYD 7.470788
MAD 10.783173
MDL 20.020031
MGA 5273.159935
MKD 61.663383
MMK 2480.553789
MNT 4210.619832
MOP 9.512677
MRU 46.954944
MUR 53.92267
MVR 18.261671
MWK 2050.363246
MXN 20.509776
MYR 4.656351
MZN 75.314989
NAD 18.93177
NGN 1646.685402
NIO 43.512605
NOK 11.46028
NPR 173.01539
NZD 1.96659
OMR 0.454064
PAB 1.182499
PEN 3.982709
PGK 5.066837
PHP 69.546314
PKR 331.003457
PLN 4.221091
PYG 7862.366893
QAR 4.322657
RON 5.095918
RSD 117.433734
RUB 90.421532
RWF 1728.744025
SAR 4.429696
SBD 9.510756
SCR 17.716387
SDG 710.496468
SEK 10.592606
SGD 1.50306
SHP 0.886224
SLE 28.733281
SLL 24769.669596
SOS 675.81645
SRD 44.91603
STD 24448.945792
STN 24.417288
SVC 10.347082
SYP 13063.832022
SZL 18.9229
THB 37.308921
TJS 11.044235
TMT 4.134283
TND 3.411544
TOP 2.844103
TRY 51.370125
TTD 8.005948
TWD 37.334917
TZS 3057.585555
UAH 50.925541
UGX 4223.692596
USD 1.181224
UYU 45.874604
UZS 14456.031409
VES 408.634194
VND 30735.440779
VUV 140.750731
WST 3.202039
XAF 653.770082
XAG 0.015034
XAU 0.000251
XCD 3.192316
XCG 2.131081
XDR 0.811755
XOF 653.742502
XPF 119.331742
YER 281.51517
ZAR 18.981261
ZMK 10632.429606
ZMW 23.206373
ZWL 380.353551
  • SCS

    0.0200

    16.14

    +0.12%

  • RIO

    1.5370

    92.617

    +1.66%

  • CMSC

    0.0100

    23.76

    +0.04%

  • GSK

    0.8900

    52.5

    +1.7%

  • CMSD

    -0.0300

    24.07

    -0.12%

  • BTI

    -0.0450

    60.645

    -0.07%

  • NGG

    -0.1500

    85.11

    -0.18%

  • BP

    -0.1150

    37.765

    -0.3%

  • RBGPF

    0.1000

    82.5

    +0.12%

  • BCC

    1.5550

    82.385

    +1.89%

  • AZN

    1.3400

    191.78

    +0.7%

  • RYCEF

    0.7000

    16.7

    +4.19%

  • BCE

    0.0750

    25.92

    +0.29%

  • JRI

    0.0430

    13.12

    +0.33%

  • VOD

    0.1850

    14.835

    +1.25%

  • RELX

    -0.1250

    35.68

    -0.35%


Iran's collapse fuels Revolt




Over the past year the Iranian economy has slid into its most severe crisis since the 1979 revolution. The national currency, the rial, has lost nearly half of its value against the United States dollar in the space of a year, with exchange rates in the open market climbing from around 817,000 rials per dollar at the start of 2025 to well over 1.4 million by the end of December. In parallel, inflation has remained above 40 per cent for several consecutive years, and the cost of staple foods has skyrocketed – bread and grains have almost doubled in price and fruit has climbed by more than 70 per cent in the past twelve months. Years of international sanctions, particularly on oil exports, have eroded government revenues and restricted access to hard currency. A multi‑tier exchange system has allowed importers linked to the political elite to buy dollars at preferential rates, reinforcing perceptions of deep economic injustice. 

These structural weaknesses have been exacerbated by external shocks. A twelve‑day war with Israel in mid‑2025 damaged infrastructure across several cities and caused further economic disruption. In September 2025 the United Nations re‑imposed sanctions linked to Iran’s nuclear programme, and a new tier in the national fuel subsidy system introduced in December raised petrol prices for many households. The cumulative effect has been a sharp decline in purchasing power for ordinary Iranians and a contraction in gross domestic product that is forecast to continue through 2026. 

Protests ignite across the country
The acute deterioration in living standards reached a tipping point on 28 December 2025. Merchants and shopkeepers in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar closed their premises in protest at soaring prices and the collapsing currency. Their grievances quickly resonated with a wider cross‑section of society. Within days, demonstrations had spread to the provinces and to university campuses. Students, workers, oil sector employees and lorry drivers joined the strikes, turning an economic protest into a nationwide movement challenging the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic. 

Protesters chanted slogans that harked back to Iran’s monarchical past and openly called for the resignation of key figures in the Islamic government. They denounced corruption and the dominance of the Revolutionary Guard Corps in sectors ranging from oil to construction. Anxiety about price volatility – the inability of merchants to set stable prices for imported goods – was as potent a driver as the level of inflation itself. The convergence of bazaaris, students and industrial workers signalled a new and dangerous alliance for the regime, recalling historical moments when alliances between merchants and clerics had toppled previous governments. 

Government response and growing casualties
Faced with the largest challenge to its authority in years, the government of President Masoud Pezeshkian acknowledged that the crisis was self‑inflicted and promised to listen to “legitimate demands”. The central bank governor was dismissed and a monthly food coupon system was introduced to cushion the poorest households, while officials talked of institutional reforms and new subsidies to support essential goods. At the same time, security forces moved swiftly to suppress the unrest. Police and Revolutionary Guard units deployed tear gas, batons and, in some cases, live ammunition. Internet access was throttled across the country, leaving citizens cut off from one another and from the outside world.

Rights organisations estimate that thousands of protesters and members of the security forces have been killed since late December. Tens of thousands have been arrested. The authorities have not issued official casualty figures but concede that many security personnel have died. Footage circulating on social media shows large crowds chanting in support of the exiled Pahlavi heir, burning portraits of the Supreme Leader and attacking symbols of the state. 

International implications and the path ahead
The turmoil has reverberated far beyond Iran’s borders. Diplomatic missions were briefly shut, and governments in Europe and North America summoned Iranian ambassadors to protest at the crackdown. The United States, which reimposed unilateral sanctions in 2018 and was involved in recent military strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities, has warned that further violence against demonstrators could trigger intervention. Calls for the Iranian government to respect fundamental freedoms have come from allied governments and international organisations. 

Internally, the protests reveal deep structural tensions within the Islamic Republic. The concentration of economic power in the Revolutionary Guard Corps has deprived elected officials of the means to manage the economy, while corruption and opaque networks of patronage have alienated the bazaar merchants who once underpinned the system. A prolonged drought, air pollution and energy shortages have further undermined the regime’s legitimacy. 

Whether this wave of unrest will bring about immediate political change remains uncertain. Iran has witnessed large‑scale protests in 2009, 2017, 2019 and 2022, all of which were eventually suppressed. The current movement is remarkable for its geographic reach – demonstrations have been reported in all 31 provinces – and for the diversity of participants. However, opposition factions remain fragmented, and there is as yet no universally recognised figurehead capable of unifying the disparate groups. The security apparatus remains loyal to the Supreme Leader, and there are few signs of internal splits that could precipitate a rapid collapse of the regime.

Nevertheless, the economic crisis shows no sign of abating. With oil revenues constrained, inflation entrenched and the currency in freefall, the government’s tools for stabilisation are limited. Many Iranians believe that nothing short of a fundamental transformation of the political system will end decades of hardship. The protests of late 2025 and early 2026 may therefore mark the beginning of a new chapter in Iran’s modern history – a turning point where economic desperation accelerates the decline of a revolutionary regime that has dominated the country for almost half a century.