The Japan Times - Russia’s dollar pivot

EUR -
AED 4.272351
AFN 72.705629
ALL 95.362765
AMD 428.855563
ANG 2.082906
AOA 1067.941786
ARS 1660.358699
AUD 1.625383
AWG 2.096913
AZN 1.976209
BAM 1.956028
BBD 2.346204
BDT 142.986682
BGN 1.942677
BHD 0.439361
BIF 3467.919494
BMD 1.163336
BND 1.48828
BOB 8.048904
BRL 5.862744
BSD 1.164841
BTN 110.599329
BWP 15.639093
BYN 3.218117
BYR 22801.380147
BZD 2.342804
CAD 1.610819
CDF 2629.138359
CHF 0.915074
CLF 0.026387
CLP 1038.533439
CNY 7.870256
CNH 7.864946
COP 4149.734853
CRC 529.264022
CUC 1.163336
CUP 30.828397
CVE 110.279288
CZK 24.279046
DJF 207.435092
DKK 7.473665
DOP 68.028229
DZD 154.153586
EGP 60.512035
ERN 17.450036
ETB 184.609331
FJD 2.555734
FKP 0.864506
GBP 0.86459
GEL 3.105782
GGP 0.864506
GHS 13.698775
GIP 0.864506
GMD 84.92338
GNF 10211.498557
GTQ 8.886151
GYD 243.707385
HKD 9.118633
HNL 30.99975
HRK 7.535279
HTG 152.491068
HUF 355.848691
IDR 20797.185366
ILS 3.282527
IMP 0.864506
INR 110.652768
IQD 1525.97147
IRR 1571957.393867
ISK 143.613853
JEP 0.864506
JMD 183.484561
JOD 0.824786
JPY 185.793441
KES 150.920276
KGS 101.734068
KHR 4674.605642
KMF 493.253968
KPW 1046.833755
KRW 1765.46677
KWD 0.359692
KYD 0.970709
KZT 569.654011
LAK 25530.649369
LBP 104316.9153
LKR 385.429997
LRD 212.597544
LSL 18.974191
LTL 3.435028
LVL 0.70369
LYD 7.381305
MAD 10.702108
MDL 20.094431
MGA 4897.65559
MKD 61.655638
MMK 2442.387668
MNT 4160.670603
MOP 9.403857
MRU 46.510762
MUR 55.083695
MVR 17.927122
MWK 2020.713884
MXN 20.191622
MYR 4.612394
MZN 74.342957
NAD 18.9741
NGN 1595.759514
NIO 42.866475
NOK 10.813846
NPR 176.957405
NZD 1.962221
OMR 0.447303
PAB 1.164836
PEN 3.959959
PGK 5.090747
PHP 71.805152
PKR 323.755501
PLN 4.236694
PYG 7010.908333
QAR 4.238615
RON 5.248624
RSD 117.399219
RUB 83.759812
RWF 1700.796825
SAR 4.370366
SBD 9.344448
SCR 14.908099
SDG 698.584708
SEK 10.82919
SGD 1.487482
SHP 0.868548
SLE 28.67606
SLL 24394.570867
SOS 664.911694
SRD 43.374393
STD 24078.700675
STN 24.50328
SVC 10.193145
SYP 128.585938
SZL 18.916532
THB 37.919512
TJS 10.751993
TMT 4.071675
TND 3.387052
TOP 2.801033
TRY 53.43306
TTD 7.910889
TWD 36.569108
TZS 3036.309692
UAH 51.62281
UGX 4391.493464
USD 1.163336
UYU 46.765657
UZS 13879.61928
VES 638.304918
VND 30632.956226
VUV 137.813195
WST 3.158676
XAF 656.044817
XAG 0.015454
XAU 0.000259
XCD 3.143973
XCG 2.099436
XDR 0.815909
XOF 656.036357
XPF 119.331742
YER 277.590597
ZAR 18.976353
ZMK 10471.41986
ZMW 21.171743
ZWL 374.593628
  • CMSC

    0.0300

    22.77

    +0.13%

  • CMSD

    -0.1300

    22.8

    -0.57%

  • BCC

    -1.1700

    68.33

    -1.71%

  • JRI

    -0.2600

    12.66

    -2.05%

  • NGG

    -1.5300

    80

    -1.91%

  • BCE

    -0.0500

    25.06

    -0.2%

  • RYCEF

    -0.8400

    17.16

    -4.9%

  • RIO

    2.5700

    108.96

    +2.36%

  • RBGPF

    -3.0200

    60.52

    -4.99%

  • RELX

    1.8100

    34.6

    +5.23%

  • VOD

    0.0100

    14.97

    +0.07%

  • GSK

    -1.2300

    49.31

    -2.49%

  • BTI

    -0.7900

    61

    -1.3%

  • BP

    1.0700

    42.94

    +2.49%

  • AZN

    -5.9600

    179.71

    -3.32%


Russia’s dollar pivot




For years, Moscow positioned itself as the standard‑bearer of de‑dollarization. After Western sanctions were imposed in 2022, the Kremlin accelerated efforts to settle trade in local currencies, expanded gold reserves and championed alternative payment systems within the bloc of major emerging economies known as BRICS. Senior officials boasted that the age of the greenback was ending, and state media presented the shift as a moral stand against Western financial hegemony.

That narrative now faces an extraordinary test. According to an internal government memorandum circulated among senior officials early this year and reported by multiple media outlets, Russia is exploring a broad economic rapprochement with the United States in return for sanctions relief and progress on a settlement in Ukraine. The document lists seven areas of potential cooperation, from fossil fuels and natural gas to offshore oil exploration and strategic minerals. The most striking element is Moscow’s readiness to re‑enter the dollar settlement system—a reversal of the policy that has underpinned its eastward economic pivot.

De‑dollarization and the BRICS currency dream
Russia’s push to reduce dependence on the U.S. dollar has been most visible in its trade with China. By mid‑2023, President Vladimir Putin told a St Petersburg business forum that more than four‑fifths of bilateral trade was being settled in rubles and yuan, noting that reliance on the dollar exposed both sides to risks and costs. The trend accelerated: at the Boao Forum for Asia in March 2024, Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk said around 92 percent of trade settlement between Russia and China was being conducted in the two countries’ currencies. Bilateral trade volumes reached $240 billion in 2023, up sharply from the previous year, and the share of deals using local currencies climbed from a quarter in 2021 to two‑thirds in 2023.

These shifts were part of a broader agenda within BRICS. At the bloc’s summit in Kazan in October 2024, leaders discussed the idea of creating a new reserve currency backed by a basket of their national currencies. On stage, Mr Putin held up a prototype banknote meant to symbolise a BRICS currency. Yet he struck a conciliatory note, stressing that the goal was not to “refuse or fight the dollar” but to prevent its “weaponization” by developing mechanisms for local‑currency trade. Officials from other member states expressed similar caution. The bloc’s New Development Bank made clear there was “no suggestion right now” of launching a new currency.

Within BRICS, the shift away from the dollar has been uneven but significant. Roughly 60–67 percent of intra‑BRICS trade is now estimated to be settled in local currencies, according to government data. Russia’s bilateral trade with China and India is said to be 90–95 percent denominated in rubles, yuan and rupees. However, the dollar still accounts for about 88–89 percent of global foreign exchange transactions and remains the dominant currency for energy and commodity trading. Energy contracts are largely priced in dollars, and global capital markets continue to operate primarily in the U.S. currency.

A leaked memo and a potential U.S. deal
Against this backdrop, the leaked Kremlin memorandum marks a dramatic change of tone. The document proposes an “energy dominance” partnership in which the United States and Russia would transition from rivals to partners, focusing on joint investments in liquefied natural gas, offshore drilling and the development of critical minerals such as palladium and nickel. In exchange for a peace framework in Ukraine and the easing of sanctions, Moscow would re‑open its economy to American firms and return to dollar‑denominated trade. The memo describes this shift as an economic realignment rather than a symbolic gesture, arguing that reintegration into the dollar system would expand Russia’s access to global liquidity, lower transaction costs and stabilise its currency markets.

Such a pivot would reverse years of painstaking efforts to insulate Russia from U.S. financial pressure. Since 2022, nearly 90 percent of Russia’s trade with China and India has been settled in national currencies, and the share of local‑currency settlement across BRICS has climbed steadily. Russia’s removal from the SWIFT financial messaging system forced banks to adopt alternative channels. Returning to the dollar would restore access to deep capital markets but would also reintroduce exposure to potential U.S. sanctions and financial surveillance.

Why Moscow might turn back
Analysts point to several reasons why the Kremlin might consider embracing the dollar once more. First, the de‑dollarization drive has increased Russia’s dependence on China. Using the yuan binds Moscow to a partner whose economic clout far exceeds its own, giving Beijing significant leverage. The leaked memo implicitly acknowledges this imbalance by proposing diversification through renewed engagement with the United States. Second, the dollar’s dominance in global trade and finance remains overwhelming. According to central bank data, the greenback makes up the majority of foreign exchange reserves and still facilitates most energy transactions. Re‑entering dollar‑based systems would improve liquidity for Russian businesses and help stabilise the ruble, which has seen volatile swings against the U.S. currency.

A return to dollar settlements could also serve as a bargaining chip. Moscow may hope to leverage its willingness to rejoin the U.S. financial architecture to secure sanctions relief and concessions on Ukraine. In this interpretation, the memo is less a repudiation of BRICS than a pragmatic negotiation tactic. It signals openness to compromise without committing to immediate policy changes. The Kremlin has not publicly confirmed the document’s authenticity, and officials have said that any agreement would depend on complex diplomatic alignments and legislative approval in Washington.

Strains on BRICS and relations with Beijing
Even the suggestion of a dollar comeback has unsettled other BRICS members. China has invested heavily in internationalising the yuan, and India has expanded rupee settlements. A Russian about‑face would slow the momentum behind alternative payment systems and cast doubt on proposals like BRICS Pay. It could also introduce friction within the bloc: Brazil, South Africa and Saudi Arabia have backed gradual de‑dollarization as a means of strengthening economic sovereignty. For them, Russia’s shift might look like a betrayal of a shared agenda.

The move could have significant geopolitical consequences for Russia’s relationship with China. Beijing has been Moscow’s lifeline since the invasion of Ukraine, purchasing discounted oil and gas and providing access to technology. In return, Moscow has become more reliant on Chinese investment and currency channels. A pivot toward the dollar risks antagonising China and weakening a partnership that both sides describe as a “no‑limits” friendship. Some observers suggest that the Kremlin is betting it can balance ties with Washington and Beijing or at least extract concessions from both.

An uncertain path ahead
For now, Russia remains deeply integrated into the Chinese economic sphere. Trade in local currencies continues to expand, and the BRICS countries have not abandoned the idea of enhancing payment mechanisms independent of the U.S. dollar. The leaked memo is a reminder that geopolitical strategies are shaped as much by pragmatism as by ideology. Moscow’s de‑dollarization campaign has always been about hedging against Western pressure rather than declaring a clean break. If sanctions were lifted and economic incentives aligned, a return to the dollar would be less ideological surrender than tactical adjustment.

Still, the implications are profound. Should Russia re‑enter dollar‑based trade, it would signal that even a leading advocate of alternative currencies sees advantages in the existing system. It would test the cohesion of BRICS and force Beijing to reassess the balance of power within the partnership. Above all, it underscores the resilience of the greenback: despite repeated predictions of its decline, the U.S. dollar remains the anchor of global finance, and even those who challenge it may find themselves drawn back into its orbit.