The Japan Times - Russia’s dollar pivot

EUR -
AED 4.251811
AFN 74.676969
ALL 91.824045
AMD 420.444952
ANG 2.072782
AOA 1062.80796
ARS 1750.50039
AUD 1.618835
AWG 2.085383
AZN 1.972314
BAM 1.954141
BBD 2.33287
BDT 142.928686
BGN 1.948991
BHD 0.436739
BIF 3455.156879
BMD 1.157742
BND 1.468566
BOB 14.419699
BRL 5.930417
BSD 1.158242
BTN 110.612592
BWP 15.604025
BYN 3.517705
BYR 22691.749795
BZD 2.329483
CAD 1.6062
CDF 2670.911682
CHF 0.947022
CLF 0.027546
CLP 1087.687364
CNY 7.766425
CNH 7.765285
COP 3581.371721
CRC 521.768403
CUC 1.157742
CUP 30.680172
CVE 110.171965
CZK 24.256986
DJF 206.259386
DKK 7.475212
DOP 68.173608
DZD 154.638086
EGP 59.397505
ERN 17.366135
ETB 186.964939
FJD 2.576845
FKP 0.855823
GBP 0.856903
GEL 3.01436
GGP 0.855823
GHS 13.273676
GIP 0.855823
GMD 85.097551
GNF 10182.258182
GTQ 8.843532
GYD 242.323275
HKD 9.080063
HNL 31.087151
HRK 7.53262
HTG 151.385431
HUF 364.266842
IDR 20420.259331
ILS 3.509522
IMP 0.855823
INR 110.425059
IQD 1517.312142
IRR 1591432.615658
ISK 139.75103
JEP 0.855823
JMD 182.95787
JOD 0.820812
JPY 178.405199
KES 149.869739
KGS 101.24519
KHR 4697.134901
KMF 492.039902
KPW 1041.968471
KRW 1557.348276
KWD 0.357002
KYD 0.965202
KZT 522.657667
LAK 25914.340292
LBP 103723.249961
LKR 380.781735
LRD 202.106711
LSL 18.702568
LTL 3.418512
LVL 0.700307
LYD 7.32594
MAD 10.823467
MDL 20.072137
MGA 4985.854259
MKD 61.472823
MMK 2431.206788
MNT 4163.908015
MOP 9.355859
MRU 46.574474
MUR 54.379389
MVR 17.887478
MWK 2008.429989
MXN 19.669576
MYR 4.706802
MZN 73.991729
NAD 18.702729
NGN 1534.437273
NIO 42.624926
NOK 10.769429
NPR 176.983602
NZD 2.00099
OMR 0.446111
PAB 1.158212
PEN 3.895094
PGK 5.228562
PHP 72.776261
PKR 321.100591
PLN 4.325209
PYG 6859.32609
QAR 4.222035
RON 5.251281
RSD 117.229992
RUB 97.782461
RWF 1708.479398
SAR 4.343242
SBD 9.276996
SCR 15.939851
SDG 696.38304
SEK 11.263849
SGD 1.468891
SHP 0.857047
SLE 28.422534
SLL 24277.268525
SOS 661.949588
SRD 43.899856
STD 23962.928893
STN 24.479751
SVC 10.134617
SYP 15052.966154
SZL 18.705527
THB 38.391
TJS 10.713614
TMT 4.063676
TND 3.380445
TOP 2.787566
TRY 56.288972
TTD 7.861497
TWD 36.728225
TZS 3065.140207
UAH 51.592801
UGX 4482.176281
USD 1.157742
UYU 46.621234
UZS 13620.38053
VES 962.602203
VND 30019.679914
VUV 136.98027
WST 3.167567
XAF 655.957
XAG 0.018085
XAU 0.000267
XCD 3.128856
XCG 2.087428
XDR 0.818584
XOF 655.957
XPF 119.331742
YER 274.443075
ZAR 18.740497
ZMK 10421.070972
ZMW 22.354605
ZWL 372.79256
SSP 6540.376337
MXV 2.230968
  • GSK

    0.0100

    48.13

    +0.02%

  • RBGPF

    0.2800

    68.02

    +0.41%

  • VOD

    0.0700

    17.4

    +0.4%

  • RYCEF

    0.4100

    19.54

    +2.1%

  • NGG

    0.4800

    76.86

    +0.62%

  • CMSC

    0.0100

    20.45

    +0.05%

  • RELX

    -0.0200

    33.8

    -0.06%

  • BCE

    0.1400

    23.39

    +0.6%

  • RIO

    0.5700

    99.96

    +0.57%

  • CMSD

    -0.0200

    20.32

    -0.1%

  • BCC

    0.3900

    75.44

    +0.52%

  • BTI

    0.3800

    55.24

    +0.69%

  • AZN

    0.5300

    160.17

    +0.33%

  • BP

    0.0200

    46.1

    +0.04%

  • JRI

    -0.0700

    12.01

    -0.58%


Russia’s dollar pivot




For years, Moscow positioned itself as the standard‑bearer of de‑dollarization. After Western sanctions were imposed in 2022, the Kremlin accelerated efforts to settle trade in local currencies, expanded gold reserves and championed alternative payment systems within the bloc of major emerging economies known as BRICS. Senior officials boasted that the age of the greenback was ending, and state media presented the shift as a moral stand against Western financial hegemony.

That narrative now faces an extraordinary test. According to an internal government memorandum circulated among senior officials early this year and reported by multiple media outlets, Russia is exploring a broad economic rapprochement with the United States in return for sanctions relief and progress on a settlement in Ukraine. The document lists seven areas of potential cooperation, from fossil fuels and natural gas to offshore oil exploration and strategic minerals. The most striking element is Moscow’s readiness to re‑enter the dollar settlement system—a reversal of the policy that has underpinned its eastward economic pivot.

De‑dollarization and the BRICS currency dream
Russia’s push to reduce dependence on the U.S. dollar has been most visible in its trade with China. By mid‑2023, President Vladimir Putin told a St Petersburg business forum that more than four‑fifths of bilateral trade was being settled in rubles and yuan, noting that reliance on the dollar exposed both sides to risks and costs. The trend accelerated: at the Boao Forum for Asia in March 2024, Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk said around 92 percent of trade settlement between Russia and China was being conducted in the two countries’ currencies. Bilateral trade volumes reached $240 billion in 2023, up sharply from the previous year, and the share of deals using local currencies climbed from a quarter in 2021 to two‑thirds in 2023.

These shifts were part of a broader agenda within BRICS. At the bloc’s summit in Kazan in October 2024, leaders discussed the idea of creating a new reserve currency backed by a basket of their national currencies. On stage, Mr Putin held up a prototype banknote meant to symbolise a BRICS currency. Yet he struck a conciliatory note, stressing that the goal was not to “refuse or fight the dollar” but to prevent its “weaponization” by developing mechanisms for local‑currency trade. Officials from other member states expressed similar caution. The bloc’s New Development Bank made clear there was “no suggestion right now” of launching a new currency.

Within BRICS, the shift away from the dollar has been uneven but significant. Roughly 60–67 percent of intra‑BRICS trade is now estimated to be settled in local currencies, according to government data. Russia’s bilateral trade with China and India is said to be 90–95 percent denominated in rubles, yuan and rupees. However, the dollar still accounts for about 88–89 percent of global foreign exchange transactions and remains the dominant currency for energy and commodity trading. Energy contracts are largely priced in dollars, and global capital markets continue to operate primarily in the U.S. currency.

A leaked memo and a potential U.S. deal
Against this backdrop, the leaked Kremlin memorandum marks a dramatic change of tone. The document proposes an “energy dominance” partnership in which the United States and Russia would transition from rivals to partners, focusing on joint investments in liquefied natural gas, offshore drilling and the development of critical minerals such as palladium and nickel. In exchange for a peace framework in Ukraine and the easing of sanctions, Moscow would re‑open its economy to American firms and return to dollar‑denominated trade. The memo describes this shift as an economic realignment rather than a symbolic gesture, arguing that reintegration into the dollar system would expand Russia’s access to global liquidity, lower transaction costs and stabilise its currency markets.

Such a pivot would reverse years of painstaking efforts to insulate Russia from U.S. financial pressure. Since 2022, nearly 90 percent of Russia’s trade with China and India has been settled in national currencies, and the share of local‑currency settlement across BRICS has climbed steadily. Russia’s removal from the SWIFT financial messaging system forced banks to adopt alternative channels. Returning to the dollar would restore access to deep capital markets but would also reintroduce exposure to potential U.S. sanctions and financial surveillance.

Why Moscow might turn back
Analysts point to several reasons why the Kremlin might consider embracing the dollar once more. First, the de‑dollarization drive has increased Russia’s dependence on China. Using the yuan binds Moscow to a partner whose economic clout far exceeds its own, giving Beijing significant leverage. The leaked memo implicitly acknowledges this imbalance by proposing diversification through renewed engagement with the United States. Second, the dollar’s dominance in global trade and finance remains overwhelming. According to central bank data, the greenback makes up the majority of foreign exchange reserves and still facilitates most energy transactions. Re‑entering dollar‑based systems would improve liquidity for Russian businesses and help stabilise the ruble, which has seen volatile swings against the U.S. currency.

A return to dollar settlements could also serve as a bargaining chip. Moscow may hope to leverage its willingness to rejoin the U.S. financial architecture to secure sanctions relief and concessions on Ukraine. In this interpretation, the memo is less a repudiation of BRICS than a pragmatic negotiation tactic. It signals openness to compromise without committing to immediate policy changes. The Kremlin has not publicly confirmed the document’s authenticity, and officials have said that any agreement would depend on complex diplomatic alignments and legislative approval in Washington.

Strains on BRICS and relations with Beijing
Even the suggestion of a dollar comeback has unsettled other BRICS members. China has invested heavily in internationalising the yuan, and India has expanded rupee settlements. A Russian about‑face would slow the momentum behind alternative payment systems and cast doubt on proposals like BRICS Pay. It could also introduce friction within the bloc: Brazil, South Africa and Saudi Arabia have backed gradual de‑dollarization as a means of strengthening economic sovereignty. For them, Russia’s shift might look like a betrayal of a shared agenda.

The move could have significant geopolitical consequences for Russia’s relationship with China. Beijing has been Moscow’s lifeline since the invasion of Ukraine, purchasing discounted oil and gas and providing access to technology. In return, Moscow has become more reliant on Chinese investment and currency channels. A pivot toward the dollar risks antagonising China and weakening a partnership that both sides describe as a “no‑limits” friendship. Some observers suggest that the Kremlin is betting it can balance ties with Washington and Beijing or at least extract concessions from both.

An uncertain path ahead
For now, Russia remains deeply integrated into the Chinese economic sphere. Trade in local currencies continues to expand, and the BRICS countries have not abandoned the idea of enhancing payment mechanisms independent of the U.S. dollar. The leaked memo is a reminder that geopolitical strategies are shaped as much by pragmatism as by ideology. Moscow’s de‑dollarization campaign has always been about hedging against Western pressure rather than declaring a clean break. If sanctions were lifted and economic incentives aligned, a return to the dollar would be less ideological surrender than tactical adjustment.

Still, the implications are profound. Should Russia re‑enter dollar‑based trade, it would signal that even a leading advocate of alternative currencies sees advantages in the existing system. It would test the cohesion of BRICS and force Beijing to reassess the balance of power within the partnership. Above all, it underscores the resilience of the greenback: despite repeated predictions of its decline, the U.S. dollar remains the anchor of global finance, and even those who challenge it may find themselves drawn back into its orbit.